Abstract. Th e article develops a critique of John Deely's ontological realism, specifi cally in its relevance for the project of global semiotics. Deely, whose theorizations rely heavily on the pre-modern philosophical systems of Th omas Aquinas and the Latin scholastics, has made the most sustained att empt to give philosophical grounding to Charles Peirce's famous intuition that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs". Th e critique develops along two main lines. Firstly, I contend that Deely's account of onto logical relations is unsatisfactory, for it assumes the very fact it promises to demonstrate: the identity between patt erns of physical events, on one hand, and patt erns of thought, on the other. As it is never adequately explained what it means for the former to be identical with the latt er, the mediating term -"ontological relation" -remains highly problematic. Secondly, I argue that even if this ontological paradigm is allowed to stand as proposed, it still fails to bridge the gap between the so-called "natural" signs and human-specifi c, language-based signifi cation; for, as it posits a unity between the stipulable and the non-stipulable sign, the argument falls into a performative contradiction.
Th is article develops a critique of John Deely's ontological realism, specifi cally in its relevance for the project of global semiotics. 1 Deely's theorizations rely heavily on the pre-modern philosophical systems of Th omas Aquinas and the Latin scholastics, yet are off ered as a radical post-modern break with the philosophical mainstream (purportedly "idealistic") that begins with Descartes and reaches up to Derrida.
2 Whatever the value of this ambitious claim, Deely's writings have been the most sustained att empt to give philosophical grounding to Charles Peirce's famous intuition that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (Peirce 1935: 448) . My goal is not to criticize global semiotics per se, but rather to show that Deely's arguments fail to provide a fi rm theoretical foundation for its enterprise. I will focus primarily on Deely's Basics of Semiotics (1990) , which develops most fully the pivotal concept of "ontological relation". I will refer to other texts to the extent to which they supplement or help elucidate the author's positions. Th ose familiar with Deely's oeuvre will be aware of the fact that the author's principal arguments are restated with remarkable consistency, oft en word for word, from one text to another.
My critique will develop along two main lines. Firstly, I will contend that Deely's account of ontological relations is unsatisfactory, for it assumes the very fact it promises to demonstrate: the identity between patt erns of physical events, on one hand, and patt erns of thought, on the other. As it is never adequately explained what it means for the former to be "the same as" the latt er, the mediating term -ontological relation -remains highly problematic. Secondly, I argue that even if this ontological paradigm is allowed to stand as proposed, it still fails to bridge the gap between the so-called "natural" signs and human-specifi c, language-based signifi cation. As it posits a unity between the stipulable and the non-stipulable sign, the argument falls into a performative contradiction for "to posit" is to stipulate. Th us the order of the stipulable sign celebrates its distinctiveness in the very moment this distinctiveness is denied. 1 Global semiotics, as a framework seeking to unite the natural and human sciences, owes its existence to the intellectual and organizational eff orts of Th omas Sebeok, although Sebeok himself would trace its beginnings to Peirce, and even further -to Locke. Th e framework is implicitly present already in Sebeok's notions of "zoosemiotics" and "anthroposemiotics", introduced in his work of the 1960s. See Sebeok 1986 [1963 ], 2001 and Sebeok et al. 1964 . For the most comprehensive overview of trends and research pertaining to global semiotics, see Posner et al. 1997 Posner et al. -2004 "Semiotics recovers the 'Scholastic realism' of the Latins, but it does not (like Neothomism) simply go back to that achievement. On the contrary, semiotics goes forward, beyond modernity, with the theoretical ability in place to explain both hardcore and socially constructed 'reality' as a public phenomenon... " (Deely 2010: 87 ; emphasis in the original). For a short expose of the programme for new realism, see Deely 1995: 7-14 . Th e author's views on the development of Western philosophical thought are expounded at great length in Deely 2001. * * * Th e problem facing global semiotics is simple to state, even if it is not simple to solve. Global semiotics could behave, in the manner of science, as if it already has access to a fi eld of "facts", so that all it needs to do is evaluate and organize those facts. It could, for example, cite the authority of Peirce or Morris and take it as given that there is semiotic activity everywhere in nature, then proceed to analyse, say, the specifi cs of semiosis in the world of plants as distinct (yet fundamentally similar) to that found in the world of animals and humans. Th e alternative road is that of philosophical self-consciousness. 3 On this road, global semiotics would have to ask what makes the facts factual, what -other than the authority of Peirce or Morris -allows us to fi nd semiosis beyond the human realm. Th e choice is, essentially, between what Heidegger (1962: 11) distinguished as the "ontical" and the "ontological" approaches, respectively. To approach things "ontically" is to approach them directly, without a general preconception of the being that belongs to them. By contrast, to approach things "ontologically" is to ask what it means that they are.
For global semiotics, the ontical approach would presuppose that we know in advance what this thing "semiosis" is, just as we know the domain in which we must search for it. Th us we simply proceed to locate it there and analyse its characteristics from one sub-region to another. But such a procedure may strike some as too facile. No one, for instance, would think of searching for cardinal numbers among the fauna of North America, for the obvious reason that cardinal numbers belong to a diff erent order of being than the one proper to animals or geographic locations. And in the case we are currently considering, one may say that it is by no means evident that semiosis and nature, the sought-for phenomenon, and the domain in which the search is conducted, are ontologically concordant. Th e second approach would seek to resolve this problem before commencing with the search. By contrast with the ontical, the ontological view impels one to ask, fi rst, what kind of being is proper to semiosis, on the one hand, and to nature, on the other. Th e ontical question is whether such and such a being can be found in such-and-such a domain. Th e ontological question, which prepares the ontical and gives it a proper foundation, is whether such-and-such a being is fi ndable in such-and-such a domain.
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It is this second road of philosophical self-consciousness that Petrilli and Ponzio (2001: 21) advocate (although it is by no means evident that their good wishes have ever come close to being realized): "[T]he doctrine of signs is the sign science that questions itself, att empts to answer for itself, and inquires into its very own foundations. As a doctrine of signs, semiotics is also philosophy not because it deludes itself into believing it can substitute philosophy, but because it does not delude itself into believing that the study of signs is possible without the philosophical question regarding its conditions of possibility". See also Umberto Eco's state ment to the same eff ect quoted at the end of this essay.
What distinguishes John Deely from most other proponents of global semiotics is that he has taken the second, ontological, question seriously and found it necessary to provide an answer to it. He has sensed, though not said, that the debate in semiotics cannot deteriorate to the level of a shouting match between children, in which each insists that something is, because it is. When opponents question the continuity between human communication and whatever is called communication among other beings, it is not suffi cient to reply that those people refuse to see what is there. One needs to establish, in advance, a fundamental framework that specifi es the mode of being proper to signs and show that this mode of being is common to both human and non-human beings. And this is exactly what Deely sets out to do.
Taking inspiration from the writings of John Poinsot, Deely declares that the world consists not only of individuals (entities, whether animate or not), but also of the patt erns that obtain between bodies, events, personalities. Individuals everywhere are inserted within networks of relations. Countering Michel de Certeau's claim that a relation is "always social" (De Certeau 1984: xi) , Deely (1994b: 2; emphasis in the original) writes: "Th e relationships by which the individuals sustain their being as such are by no means always social: they may be merely environmental and physical, as among asteroids and atoms (assuming these not to be living individuals) or also vital, as among plants, and further social as among some animals, or even cultural, as among human animals". Deely's primary task, then, is to show that all these sundry relations, despite their apparent heterogeneity, are in fact species of the same kind. Th is is where the concept of ontological relation makes its appearance:
Since it is a question of being at this point, and of the being, as we shall see, whence semiosis is possible as a fact of nature, we are at an appropriate point to suggest the name "ontological relation" for that pure form of intersubjective being that is indiff erently physical or objective and contrasts in what is proper to it with the various forms of intrasubjective being otherwise making up the physical order of "transcendental relation" in its full extent. (Deely 1990: 44) Th e passage not only introduces a pivotal notion, but also spells out what is at stake in this conceptual move. It is nothing less than laying the philosophical ground for global semiosis, that is -demonstrating the discoverability of semiosis beyond the human realm.
Ontological relation, to which Aquinas and Poinsot had referred also as relatio secundum esse, is something like a patt ern of interaction abstracted from the items participating in the interaction. It is pure mediation conceived not as an act of consciousness, but as an existent, something present in the world. Th e peculiarity of this existent is that it can be present "physically", "objectively", or both at the same time and in varying proportions. Physical being is the order of things as extant independently of knowledge. Objective being is the order of everything that exists as known in one way or another (Deely 1990: 59) . 4 Apart from these two kinds of being, there is also relative being or the being proper to relation.
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It is easy to see how the notion of ontological relation is arrived at. I can think, for example, of the Moon orbiting around the Earth as a relation between two astral bodies. Th en I can think that this relation will persist even without me or anyone else thinking it. Now, since I know that there are also relations that are intellectual without having any physical correlate, I decide to institute a general kind, relation as such, and think of the physical and intellectual relations as its subspecies or instantiations. Th e problem of instituting or stipulating will play signifi cant role in the further course of my argument. At present, I would like only to point out that the entire ontological scheme rests on one condition: in order for the general kind (ontological relation) to be at all sustainable, it must be shown that its species (physical relation and objective relation) are in fact instances of one and the same thing. Without this commonality, it makes no sense to speak of some overarching form of being.
Not only is relative being in itself mediation; it also serves in Deely's greater ontological scheme to mediate between the other two orders of being. Since it can be "realized" not only through consciousness, but also in the universe of matt er, it allows one to speak of the existence of semiosis -at least virtually -in every corner of that universe, "including those domains where humans have never set foot" (Deely 2004: 25) . Th e point Deely struggles to get across, the crucial point on which his case for global semiosis ultimately depends, is that ontological relation respects not the diff erence between mind-dependent and mind-independent existence: "Th e peculiarity of ontological relation -whereby it, and it alone in the whole of physical reality, is indiff erent to the source or ground of its being -underlies semiosis as a unique type of activity in nature" (Deely 1990: 46) . 6 Th e point is crucial, yet far from clear. In some places, it seems like all Deely wishes to establish is that a patt ern conceived in thought and a patt ern obtaining in 4 Th e term "objective being" hearkens back to the esse objectivum of Scholastic philosophy. See Tweedale 2007: 71-78. 5 "What distinguishes relation as an accident of substance is not that it is in the substance but that by virtue of relation one substance is toward another, whether in thought or in reality or both" (Deely 2010a: 336) . In his more recent writings, Deely has used the term "purely objective reality" for what in Basics of Semiotics is called "relative" or "inter subjective" being. For a discussion of the concept, see Ramirez 2010. 6 It is again Poinsot whom Deely credits with having att ained "a standpoint superior to the division of being into what exists independently of our cognition (ens reale, 'mind-independent being'), and what exists dependently upon cognition (ens rationis, 'mind-dependent being)" (Deely 1982: 169). nature is in both cases a patt ern (Deely 1990: 43 Th us when he speaks of clouds and rain as a natural patt ern of causality that can also be apprehended in thought (Deely 1990 (Deely : 47, 2004 , the suggestion certainly is that we have not only a relation here and a relation there, but the same relation here and there. Th is, of course, is an indispensable prerequisite if one wishes -as Deely most defi nitely does -to advocate the adequacy of human cognition to reality. But it does not follow from the much more modest assertion that intellectual and physical relations are alike in kind. Th e following excerpt is a good example of the ambiguous fashion in which Deely handles the diffi culty: "But an intersubjective mode of being objectively represented is in principle no other than the thing it is represented to be. Both what is thought and the basis on which it is thought, both what is apart from the mind and what is conceived in the mind, are relations in the same sense, are in their content identical, even though and when the two may diverge" (Deely 1990 : 43; emphasis added).
7 What does it mean that the representation and the thing represented are the same "in principle"? And how are we to understand that relations in the mind and the ones apart from it may diverge, yet remain identical "in their content"? Since Deely does not provide, either in this text or elsewhere, an unambiguous account of the relationship of form to content, one has to assume that the two are run together on purpose, so as to make it seem as if identity of form implies identity of content or somehow guarantees it. Simply put, if I am merely aware that there is a patt ern between phenomena A and B, I am at least on my way to fi guring out what the patt ern is.
Admitt ing that the topic of relations is quite abstract, Deely proposes a refreshingly concrete illustration drawn from human life. An ontological relation obtains between a father and his son. It is called "parenthood". Th is is instantiated fi rst as a physical relation, and then, to the extent that "the parent or anyone else thinks about it" (Deely 1990: 45) , it exists also objectively. "Th at is to say, it is recognized as existing as well as existing" (Deely 1990: 40) . Th is way of formulating the matt er leaves a strange aft ertaste. One senses that for Deely physical and objective being are not quite on the same level, that there is actually an order of priority in which the former constitutes true existence, while the latt er amounts to no more than registering this true existence. Yet it is by no means evident that the brute physical fact (the moment of conception) comes fi rst, while the knowledge of it follows. It is not diffi cult to imagine that two grown-ups who love each other 7 For a similarly ambiguous formulation, see Deely 1994: 102. would think of themselves as potential parents much before conception actually takes place. One could certainly wonder whether it is not, in fact, the psychological pre-conception that determines the physical conception. Th e reader cannot help but sense in Deely's words a stealthy recourse to biological determinism which unconditionally impels the human race to procreate. Only in such wise could the act of human reproduction be seen as more primal than its cultural conditioning. Needless to say, such a determinism is its own indictment.
Deely gives the same name, "parenthood", to both the physical and the objective moments, which makes it easier for him to maintain that we are dealing with one and the same relation on both sides. But, since the "sameness" is precisely the issue here, and since the issue should not be decided by nomination, it seems more prudent to refer to one moment as, say, "genetic commonality" and to the other as "parenthood". We can then ask with appropriate clarity whether, and in what sense, can the objective relation (parenthood) be said to be identical with the physical one (genetic commonality). Most people, for most of human history, have thought of parenthood (theirs or someone else's) without thinking of DNA and without trying to visualize the exact moment and circumstances in which a child was conceived. Should we say then that in the great majority of cases the physical relation is not the same as the objective, that, as Deely puts it, they do not "overlap"?
But how can they ever overlap? For the physical and objective relations to have the same content, one must either expand the former illegitimately or reduce the latt er, also illegitimately. One could either engage in intellectual contraband and smuggle cultural notions over to the side of what are supposedly purely physical causalities; or, alternatively, one can take the notion of parenthood (the objective side) and impoverish it so much that it starts to resemble the scientifi c procedure of ascertaining blood relations. Here is how the latt er scenario plays out under Deely's pen:
Right away it is easy to see that "being a parent" or "becoming a parent", in the minimal sense, results from an action that is over and above the being of each of the individuals taken as independent biological organisms in their own right. It is true, of course, that there are also cultural notions of parent and parenthood that overlay and are in some degree detachable from this biologically rooted notion, according to which one may "be a parent" in the cultural sense by raising off spring not begott en by one's sexual actions or "not be a parent" by failing to live up to the responsibilities ensuing from one's own sexual action. But the observing of these refi nements serves here to make clear the more determinate and limited sense in which we are posing our question. (Deely 1990: 37) Do we know where to stop in this job of "detaching" cultural overlays from that curious thing called the "biologically rooted notion" of parenthood? How much is enough? Deely gives us no reliable instructions on how to proceed in this, admitt edly, very delicate operation.
Let me, then, suggest what might be at stake here through an example of my own, also on the topic of parenthood: the American television show "Maury", in which parents learn from science whether they are biological parents or not. Whatever success the show enjoys is based on the fact that its main premise leads us to believe that "parenthood means DNA", while the viewing experience itself should convince us that "parenthood means so much more". Th e eff ect is, of course, very much planned. Both propositions, "Parenthood is DNA" and "Parenthood is so much more", are cultural stereotypes, and the show exploits the passage from one to the other as a cheap modern-day version of ethical transcendence. Th e most interesting moments on the screen are when the parent turns out not to be a parent, aft er which the question becomes whether s/he is capable of transcendence or not (i.e., capable of looking past the DNA results). For my present purposes, I would like to draw att ention not just to the people on the stage, but also to those we never get to see: the people in the laboratory, whose task it is to ascertain whether the child has the parent's genetic information. Th ey are in charge of "knowing parenthood" in the sense of that minimal, biologically determined notion that Deely stipulates. It is safe to assume that, having done this hundreds of times, they now perform the requisite tests almost automatically. Th e results are obtained; parenthood is established. But "established" here does not mean "thought". Th e results simply "show up", are recorded, then sent over to the TV studio. Th e point I wish to make is simple: when we are in the laboratory, when "knowing parenthood" is taken at the point of ultimate reduction of all cultural content (all those thoughts, emotions, behavioural patt erns, and stereo types evidenced by the people on the stage), it is very hard to say whether we are still dealing with thinking and knowing. But in that case, the distinction between physical and objective relation threatens to collapse, which would also jeopardize the notion of ontological relation. Some moment of involvement is needed for there to be "knowing"; one needs to care at least a litt le whether someone else is or is not a parent. Th is "caring", as Heidegger would certainly testify, cannot be detached from the act of knowing without the latt er ceasing to be what it is. And because knowing presupposes involvement (no less in science than in daily life), we have on the objective side something that is patently missing on the physical side. How could we ever conceive, then, that physical and objective relations may "overlap"?
A second example Deely provides to illustrate this supposed overlap is no more convincing than the fi rst. It involves a dinosaur bone, which is fi rst dug up by a gardener, who does not think much of it (to him it looks like a rock), before being sighted by a specialist on the Pleistocene. What for the gardener had been just a stone is discovered to be the bone of a prehistoric animal. Th e moral of Deely's story goes as follows:
What has happened here? A physical relation, recognized for what it had been, thanks to the dynamic interaction of its fundament (the bone) producing physical changes in the student of palaeontology's optic nerves, became at the same moment also a sign of what had been. A transcendental relation, the bone of a dinosaur, which once had a physical relation to that dinosaur, but no more (the dinosaur being dead), yet gave rise to an objective relation corresponding somewhat with the physical relation that had been. Th e gardener's rock had become the palaeontologist's sign. (Deely 1990: 49; emphasis added) Th is story is very important for understanding Deely's overall argument. It is important to Deely as well, judging by the fact that he goes back to it in later texts (Deely 1994a: 37, 113) . Aside from what the story aims to exemplify, it could be read as allegorizing the emergence of global semiotics. In such an allegorical interpretation, the uneducated gardener would be the symbolic representative of all those who have failed to see semiosis in the world of nature. Th e palaeonto logist, of course, would represent the opposite, much more enlightened camp, to which Deely himself belongs. And the bone would stand for non-linguistic semiosis, neglected and misrecognized over so many centuries of human history and thought. Less fi guratively, the story illustrates for us the passage from physicality to objectivity. We are shown how a sign function is born: when some thing that has hitherto participated only in physical interactions is "taken up into experience" (Deely 1990 (Deely : 47, 1994a . Th e transformation of physical reality into objective, sign reality is the same as the transition between Peirce's categories of secondness (a binary relationship of opposition, impact, cause-and-eff ect) and thirdness (a triadic structure in which one item relates to another for yet another, the last one being the "interpretant" of the dynamic between the fi rst two).
Th e trick succeeds only because one has put the rabbit in the hat beforehand only to pull it out later. Secondness is already implicitly thirdness, and the socalled physical relation is already implicitly objective.
8 When Deely speaks about the physical relation that had once existed between the dinosaur and the bone, he 8 Eugene Baer provides an illuminating gloss on Deely's fable: "[In virtual semiosis] all we need have is a patt ern of knowability, a patt ern of potential inferences which at one point or other in time may or may not become actualized. Th e fossilized bone contains such a patt ern. It contains a certain amount of codifi ed information about the Pleistocene deeply buried in the garden, lying there to be discovered or never to be seen at all. When the gardener (ignorant of paleontology) fi nds it, this virtual semiosis is not actualized. It remains virtual until the appropriate interpretant of the palaeontologist actualizes it" (quoted in Deely 1994a: 40).
could only mean this specifi c bone and that specifi c dinosaur, let's call him Udo. But when the paleontologist shows up in the garden, this is not what she perceives. She does not know Udo, and cannot know that this bone was once part of Udo's body. Mentally, she fi ts the bone into a general anatomical structure, not into a specifi c body that she has visualized. All she knows is that this is the bone of a dinosaur, a hypothetical animal. But hypothetical or generalized animals do not participate in physical relations, or else the term "physical" loses all its meaning. In the parenthood example, we at least had to deal with specifi c individuals, and the question was whether this son was conceived by those people. But in the absence of such specifi city, it is very misleading to speak that a physical relation is "being recognized". Obviously, Deely wants us to believe that the dinosaur's body contained not only bones, organs, and tissues, but also the patt ern of their total interaction and that, moreover, each individual part carried this patt ern as well, somehow stored within itself, through centuries and all sorts of posthumous subterranean adventures. Only in such case does it make sense to say that the physical relation has been "recognized for what it had been". Th e case is argued with disarming simplicity in another text by Deely: "Th e dinosaur, long dead, is present in the fossil bone as its extrinsic specifi er, which enables the scientist -paleontologist in this case -defi nitely to classify a bone as belonging to a brontosaurus rather than a pterodactyl, etc. " (1994a: 37).
10 But if the whole is present in each part, if the species is present in each individual, if every piece of matt er carries its own optimal intelligibility -then physical reality is in itself, or "virtually", already objective reality, and secondness is nothing but thirdness under false pretenses. Th is is what I referred to above as the rabbit trick. Deely's agenda for new realism is as old and trite as the trick itself. It prides itself on having defeated "fashionable idealism", but it has never met idealism head on. It has simply chosen to ignore one of idealism's most basic cautions: if one is to insist that there is existence outside of knowledge, then one should have the intellectual rigour of not att ributing intelligibility to that existence, for this is, aft er all, what "outside of knowledge" implies.
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In a later text, Deely is more cautious, and speaks of science "reconstructing" the physical relation that once existed. "Should that happen, a relation once only physical comes to exist again, unchanged as a relation -that is to say, in its essential rationale and structure as a relationbut now as purely objective. Th e bone is not the bone of a shark. It is, and was all along, the bone of a dinosaur. But for its relation to be realized, either the dinosaur had still to exist or a suffi ciently knowledgeable observer had to objectify the bone. Either circumstance gives rise to the relation 'of a dinosaur', whereas in the absence of both circumstances the relation as such, but not indeed the bone as such (the bone as a physical structure of calcium, etc.), wants for existence" (Deely 1994: 131 ; emphasis in the original). 10 On the notion of extrinsic specifi er, which derives from the Scholastic doctrine of species, see Deely 1994b: 123-143. Th e notion of ontological relation, then, rests on a distinction that is not a genuine distinction. One of its terms is a dummy: physical relation is contrasted with objective relation only to be shown, at a later point, to contain implicitly that which is supposed to be its opposite term. Th at "pure form of intersubjective being that is indiff erently physical or objective" is nothing but a fancy way of saying that A and B have a common element insofar as A was defi ned from the outset as function of B. Putative diff erence is posited only to be abolished in favour of unity, which is then objectifi ed as "something" that the two terms have in common.
Once the ontological scheme is set up, making a case for global semiosis becomes very easy. Semiosis is simply mapped onto the continuum of relative being, from purely material processes to the most intricate discursive constructs: "Th e semiotic web, thus, even through the causality proper to semiosis itself, turns out to be coextensive with the whole of nature and embraces not just the living world (the biosphere) nor even just the realm of cognizing organisms" (Deely 1990: 41) . Since "intersubjective relations" are to be found everywhere, semiosis is also everywhere. Distinctions within this cosmic expanse have to do only with the diff erent ways in which relative being is "realized". In those times and places where animate life is not present, we are told that semiosis exists or existed "virtually".
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When life appears on the scene, semiosis exists actually, even though it is not yet apprehended as such. At last, with the emergence of humans, semiosis enters one fi nal dimension: the stipulability of the sign.
12 Virtual signifi cation, natural signifi cation, and linguistic signifi cation build upon one another in what is unmis takably an evolutionary progression. (If it were not for the framework of evolution, this gradation of semiosis, which is equally a gradation of being, will resemble those medieval hierarchies that order worldly existents according to the extent to which they refl ect the divine essence.)
Th is nomenclature of semiosis stands or falls depending on the resolution of one fundamental issue. Th is issue, which has split the discipline of semiotics into 11 "Before there are actually signs, there are signs virtually, that is, there are beings and events so determined by other beings and events that, in their own activity as so determined, they determine yet further series of beings and events in such a way that the last terms in the series represent the fi rst terms by the mediation of the middle terms" (Deely 1990: 87) . 12 "And semiosis appears as the process whereby phenomena originating anywhere in the universe signify virtually in their present being also their past and future and begin the process of realizing these virtualities -especially when life intervenes, and, within life, when cognition supervenes. Th e process does not begins with the advent of cognitive organisms, but merely enters a further phase -a new magnitude of thirdness. At the level of anthroposemiosis, semiosis fi nally reveals itself for what it has been all along, a task that can be accomplished only in community and over the indefi nitely long run" (Deely 1994a: 38) . See also Deely 1994a Deely : 67, 1982 two warring camps, is whether human language should be taken as the standard for what semiosis properly is, or whether one should look in the world of nature in order to fi nd this standard and measure human communication by it. When one posits the existence of something like "biosemiosis", which incorporates anthroposemiosis as but one of its instances, one needs to show that the latt er, while distinct from, say, zoosemiosis, is not suffi ciently diff erent to constitute a wholly separate dimension. Th us, the batt le is waged on a highly volatile terrain, for there is, obviously, no objective standard for what should count as a suffi cient or decisive diff erence. Some have claimed, for example, that the so-called natural signs cannot be classifi ed together with conventional signs, linguistic or otherwise. For clouds "mean" rain, in a very diff erent way than the English word "rain" means rain. And one can easily argue, as Harman (1977) has done, that an all-important diff erence here is covered over by using the verb "to mean" in a rather loose fashion. How is one to determine whether the diff erence is, in fact, all-important or not? How is one to be certain whether in these two situations one is dealing with (more or less) the same phenomenon, namely, a sign? Could it be that a sign is that which we have decided to call a "sign"?
Deely is very well aware of the diffi culty. Without stating it, he knows that nothing in the things themselves would adjudicate as to whether interactions in nature are of a kind with linguistically governed interactions. Th e issue cannot be resolved on its own terms, but it could be preempted. Th at is, one could set up in advance a code for what will and what will not count as decisive diff erence; let us call it a "code of diff erence". And this is exactly what Deely's ontological meditations seek to accomplish. Th e framework of physical-objective-ontological relations serves as a code of diff erence vis-à-vis the subject matt er of semiosis (what should count as semiosis and where semiosis is to be found). Above I have argued that this code, in the way it is constructed, is open to serious objections. But here I would like to lay these objections aside and focus not on how the code is constructed but on how it functions as a code. Specifi cally, I would like to highlight the way the code resolves the diff erence between natural and conventional signs.
As we saw, the code stipulates that ontological relation is something that can be indiff erently physical, objective, or both at the same time. For what concerns us here, this stipulation essentially rules that it is a matt er of indiff erence whether the sign is determined by physical causality or whether it itself determines the meaning of physical interactions. A child is a natural token of its parents' union, that is, a token of parenthood (as Deely understands it); the token has been brought about through physical causality (I refrain from challenging this claim presently). Adultery, on the other hand, presents us with a rather diff erent situation. "Adultery" is not a token of the sexual union between two people; it is its symbol -a culturally constructed sign designating what has occurred between them. Clearly, the sign is not determined by the physical interaction between the two bodies. Th e sexual act, by itself, cannot determine whether it should be taken as a case of adultery. On the contrary: the existence of the sign (itself related to the existence of something called "monogamy" in a given social world and the ethical framework proper to it) is what makes this physical interaction a case of "adultery".
If taken by themselves, i.e., without a supervening code of diff erence, these two situations may strike one as being quite dissimilar, nay, opposite. One may wonder how it is possible to speak of the token (the child) and the symbol ("adultery") as instances of one and the same thing -"sign". Th e code of diff erence, however, serves to preempt these doubts. It stipulates that it "makes no diff erence" whether a relation is fi rst physical and then "taken up" into experience or whether it is fi rst objective (i.e., a matt er of knowledge, cultural convention, custom) before being projected onto physical reality:
Th is peculiarity of ontological relation -whereby it, and it alone in the whole of physical reality, is indiff erent to the source or ground of its being -underlies semiosis as a unique type of activity in nature. Th e same relation or set of relations that exist at one time purely objectively may be transferred as such into the order of physical being.
Th e action of signs fi rst arises precisely from physically related environmental factors coming to be seen objectively as related, and, conversely, from objectively related factors being presented as physically related. (Deely 1990: 46-47) On the terms of this code of diff erence, parenthood would be a case of "physically related… factors" (a male and female beings engaged in reproduction) "coming to be seen objectively as related", while adultery would present us with the opposite case -"objectively related factors" (the cultural notions of marriage, fi delity, monogamy, etc.) "being presented as physically related. " But since ontological relation is "indiff erent to the source or ground of its being", these opposite cases will have to be seen as not at all opposite, but rather as instances of the same thing.
Th e two types of signifi cation, which Deely distinguishes only in order to subsume them within a greater unity, are based on two diff erent conceptions of how thirdness is constituted. To the natural sign corresponds something I would like to call "thirdness by recognition". With this I intend the mysterious immanent sense that, according to Deely, is already present in purely dyadic interactions:
Th e actions and relations in such a series [of physical events] are actually at the level of secondness. But, even at that level, they anticipate the intervention of cognition and experience: they so stand to one another in relations of determining and being determined that they constitute a patt ern of knowability, a virtual thirdness, which, should it come to be actually known in some context of experience, will exhibit precisely that element of thirdness, that irreducible elemental type of representation, constitutive of the sign relation. (Deely 1990: 88; emphasis added) Th irdness by recognition is nothing but this virtual knowability inherent in things, which only waits to be "actualized" in knowledge.
13 Knowledge does nothing to its object. When it arrives, it simply takes the space already prepared for it. It merely brings to light the patt ern, or "extrinsic specifi er" latently present in the object.
On the other hand, we would have to postulate a thirdness native to the level of the stipulated sign. It is appropriate to call it "thirdness by institution". Here we do not begin with secondness, in the hope to extract from it some latent signifi cance. No matt er how closely and expertly we observe this physical act, we will never be able to determine solely on the basis of the bodily interaction its signifi cance as an act of adultery. It is the institution of marriage that determines the signifi cance of this "dynamic interaction".
One would have to assume that thirdness-by-recognition provides the basis for the natural sciences, while the study of human culture, in the broadest sense, should be grounded in thirdness-by-institution. Deely himself does not comment on this distinction, yet it follows logically from his understanding of the interplay between physical and objective relations, that is, it follows from the ontological code of diff erence. In so far as any physical relation anticipates its "realization" as an objective relation, we have thirdness-by-recognition. And in so far as objective relation can come about independently of physical reality and set the terms of the latt er, we have thirdness-by-institution. Semiotics, being the framework within which these two species of thirdness come together, can be touted as the bridge that fi nally connects the natural sciences and the humanities.
14 Th e dinosaur bone once again provides an illustration for how science knows its objects: "Th e element representative [of the relation to the dinosaur] was there, identical with the bone in physical being, but virtually distinct therefrom. When the paleontologist came along, however, this virtuality was actualized. Th e perceptual eff ect of the bone on the paleontologist, but not on the gardener, triggered the virtual element whereby the bone actually represents the dinosaur" (Deely 1990: 89) . Th is description is simplistic by any intellectual measure. Th e moment of truth, when the bone is endowed with signifi cance by the scientifi c intelligence, is presented as if it were itself a quasi-physical reaction (the sight of the thing "triggering" the identifi cation). Deely must resort to such simplistic glosses in order to skirt an alarming suggestion: that the framework of preexistent scientifi c knowledge, which makes the identifi cation of the bone possible, has itself the character of institution. Th e danger is obvious: if it is admitt ed that science gains access to its objects by means of institution, if it constructs rather than apprehends reality, then science would be no diff erent, in principle, from an ethical code. It would be forever cut off from the thing-in-itself, and the realist agenda would have to be forfeited. So as to avoid these unpleasant implications, Deely must make it seem as if the cognitive models of science are nothing but actuali zations of the immanent relations of things in the world.
We perforce rely on models in order to answer the question what something is, and models are systems of objective relations which may or may not be duplications of a system of physical relations as well. Insofar as the model is an accurate model, that is, insofar as it actually models the physical structure we seek to understand, it provides us with the essence, the "quiddity", of the structure in question, whether this structure be natural or cultural. (Deely 1994a: 131 ; emphasis in the original).
Th is passage from a later work states outright that science uses models for knowing what is what, but goes on the stipulate immediately that these models are able to "duplicate" physical reality. What we are not told, either here or elsewhere, is how we should know that a model is "accurate"? A model is another word for a code. It is the code that decides what is true within the realm it demarcates. But what decides whether the coding itself is true? In the cultural realm, that is, in the realm of the instituted sign, the question cannot even arise. An ethical code constitutes its objects by direct stipulation: this act is sin. Since in this case reality and codifi cation are indistinguishable, there are no grounds for asking whether the model "duplicates" reality. "Sin" is what is instituted and known as sin. As Nietzsche knew long ago, "sinfulness in man is not a fact, but rather the interpretation of a fact" (Nietzsche 1998: 100) . We cannot regard the thing outside the interpretation and ask ourselves, "Is this really sin?" When the code is not there, the thing is also not there. Th ere are no "virtualities" that wait to be brought to light.
With both the scientifi c and the cultural code, one needs to know the code in order to say what a particular thing is. For me to know that this thing is a fossil bone, I must know the code of paleontology. Likewise, it could be said that for me to know this thing here as a gift , I must know the cultural code of gift -giving. Yet such a way of speaking conceals a signifi cant divergence. In the second case, the code is what makes the object. Th is thing here is a gift only in an act of gift -giving and within a cultural system in which gift -giving is instituted. By contrast, Deely would maintain that this thing was a fossil bone much before there was paleontology. As an object, the bone is not created by the code, only deciphered in its essential constitution.
Th us the duality of the natural and the conventional (stipulated) sign implies ultimately a duality between two kinds of codes. On one side are those codes (or models) used by plants, animals, and scientists, which could be said to "duplicate" or reproduce reality. On the other side would be those codes, "secondary modelling systems", as the Tartu semioticians would call them, that fi rst stipulate what is reality. Even if one claims that plants and animals "interpret" their environment, they certainly do not do so by fi rst instituting interpretive paradigms. Only humans can do this. Deely is certainly aware of the distinction, but regards it, once again, as non-decisive. Th e ability of Homo sapiens to produce codes, rather than simply act in accordance with codes, is treated as an evolutionary "upgrade" within a continuity of universal semiosis (Deely 1990: 68-69) .
Once again, one might wonder whether "to produce a code", "to institute an interpretive paradigm" has anything whatsoever in common with, say, the bees' ability to execute (or react to) a determined set of fl ight-patt erns. Nothing in these acts themselves would ever decide whether they are "essentially akin" or "radically diff erent" phenomena. Th is can only be decided through the production of a new code, a meta-code, a code of diff erence. I stated this earlier, but it is necessary to repeat it here, for we have reached a rather peculiar moment: a continuity between natural and stipulated codes can only be established through a stipulated code. It is here that we see most clearly that Deely's argument is involved in something like a performative contradiction. 15 When I say that it makes no diff erence whether I speak or keep silent, I fi nd myself in a performative contradiction. Th is fact -that "it makes no diff erence whether I speak or not" -can only be established if I speak. But by speaking I make the diff erence that my words seek to abolish. If I want the fact to come to light, then it does make a big diff erence whether I speak or not. Th e fact being spoken is contradicted by the act of speaking. Similarly, when I decree that there is no decisive diff erence between code-producing and code-enacting beings, I behave as a code-producing being. In the very act of codifi cation, I make a diff erence that was not accounted for in the code itself.
To make the contradiction clearer, let us stage the general situation: we are at the discussion table at which the issue of global semiosis is debated. Th e proponents of the idea will win the day only if they succeed in showing that stipulated codes are a subset of non-stipulated (natural) codes. But this fact cannot be proven; it can only be established through a prior interpretive framework that resolves the diff erence between physical and objective reality, thirdness-by-recognition and thirdenss-by-institution, etc. In other words, the argument can only be won through the deployment of a stipulated code. Th us, in the practical context of the debate, a stipulated code makes a decisive diff erence, while those who deploy it continue to deny its phenomenological distinctiveness.
In establishing itself as a doctrine, global semiotics must be careful not to commit the same sin of which its godfather, Sebeok (2001: 71) , once accused others:
Expressions such as 'language of the bees', even when used by such an authority as Nobel Laureate, Karl von Frisch, are metaphors. As a rule of thumb, picturesque combinations of the word language with ape, dolphin, the generic word animal..., or a category of domestic pets (cat, dog), or in phrases like "the language of fl owers", are unscientifi c nonsense, rhetorical tricks designed to mislead by assuming as part of the premise the conclusion that is supposed to be demonstrated (petitio principii).
As it happens, words like "sign", "communication", "message", "code", "meaning", as deployed within the framework of global semiosis, fall under the same rule of thumb. And it is not clear why Sebeok believes they fare much bett er. No less than for "language" in reference to animals, one needs to show that these verbal labels are more than a conveniently loose way of speaking about radically heterogenous phenomena. If the authority of Frisch was insuffi cient to make the reference to animal language scientifi c, so the authority of Peirce will not be enough in the present case. Nor will the matt er be resolved by providing more "rigorous" defi nitions of what is meant by "sign", "communication", "message". For what decides where metaphoricity ends and rigour begins? Such defi nitions will always be exposed to the charge that they have been fashioned explicitly for the task at hand; that is -they have been made suffi ciently capacious in order to accommodate the broad range of diverse phenomena that global semiotics wishes to present as unifi ed. Th ere can never be a rigorous defi nition of what a "sign" is, since the only way to verify its rigour is by comparing the defi nition with the thing itself. But what the thing itself is is precisely the issue of contention. And while the contention lasts, "sign" will remain "just a fat word in place of a spindly question mark" (Nietzsche 1998: 101) .
Th e starting point of my critique was the fact that global semiotics cannot behave as if the matt er it deals with -signs -is something directly accessible in the manner of extant entities. It must fi rst make signs discoverable. For this fundamental task, it needs a general theoretical framework. It will secure a universal domain of semiosis not by more rigorous scientifi c methods, but only by positing an a priori unity between the realms of nature and culture. Umberto Eco states this realization forcefully: "When semiotics posits such concepts as 'sign' , it does not act like a science; it acts like a philosophy when it posits abstractions such as subject, good and evil, truth or revolution " (1984: 10) . He goes on to explain that philosophical entities exist only within an interpretive framework, which is to say, they are as posited, or stipulated. Th rough theoretical stipulation, "many scatt ered instances of the most diff erent facts or acts become the same thing" (1984: 10; emphasis in the original).
Deely undertakes this requisite work for the project of global semiotics by positing (après Poinsot) a form of being that transcends the old opposition between mind-dependent and mind-independent reality. As a result, physical and objective relations become "instances of the same thing". Yet, as soon as this duality is bridged, a new one immediately thrusts itself upon us: that between posited and non-posited being. Th e ontological account will not succeed in uniting culture and nature if it does not mediate between these two forms of being. But here a point of contradiction is reached. For to posit a unity between posited and non-posited being, stipulated and non-stipulated existence, is a self-defeating exercise. Th e unity itself is an instance of posited being and, as such, fails to truly resolve the diff erence between the two terms. It would not do to insist that relative being is prior to their opposition, that it is "indiff erent" or transcendent to it. For as long as this claimthe transcendence of relative being over both posited and non-posited existencecannot be demonstrated in any concrete way (and how could it? -it is, aft er all, not an empirical matt er), it remains a pure stipulation. Th us the species -posited being -proves to be its own genus. парадигму в предложенном Дили виде, не удастся преодолеть разрыв между так на-зы ваемы ми "природными" знаками и специфически человеческими, основанными на языке сигнификации, так как предлагаемая общность между конвенциональными и не-конвенциальными знаками приводит к перформативной контрадикции в аргументации.
Märkide ja luude segu: John Deely toetusest globaalsele semioosile
Artiklis arendatakse kriitikat John Deely ontoloogilise realismi suhtes, täpsemalt selle olulisuse suhtes globaalse semiootika projektis. Deely, kelle teoretiseerimine toetub tugevasti Aquino Th omase ja ladina skolastikute modernsuseelsetele fi losoofi listele süsteemidele, on teinud kõige järjekindlama katse pakkuda fi losoofi list alust Charles Peirce'i kuulsale arusaamale, et "kogu see universum on kaetud märkidega, kui see ka ei koosne eranditult märkidest". Kriitikat arendatakse kahes peamises suunas. Esiteks väidan, et Deely ülevaade ontoloogilistest suhetest jätab soovida, sest selle eelduseks on seesama fakt, mida lubatakse tõestada: ühest küljest füüsikaliste sündmuste mustrite ja teisalt mõtt emustrite vaheline identsus. Et see, mida tähendab, et esimene on teisega identne, ei leia kordagi adekvaatset selgitust, jääb vahendav termin -"ontoloogiline suhe" -äärmiselt problemaatiliseks. Teiseks väidan, et isegi kui jätt a see ontoloogiline paradigma püsima sellisena, nagu see on välja pakutud, ei õnnestu sel siiski ületada lõhet niinimetatud "looduslike" märkide ja inimspetsiifi lise, keelel põhineva tähistamise vahel, sest väitega, et konventsionaalsed ning mitt ekonventsionaalsed märgid on ühtsed, tekib argumentatsioonis performatiivne vasturääkivus.
